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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this report is to review Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) as a potential crime prevention strategy for the residents of the Bancroft 
neighborhood. CPTED is an alternative method of reducing crime which involves a variety 
of measures, including physical changes to the environment. The goal of CPTED is to 
reduce opportunities for potential offenders to commit crimes. It is based on notions of 
informal social surveillance and territoriality derived from the works of Jane Jacobs and 
Oscar Newman. 
This report finds several problems with CPTED that limit its applicability in the 
Bancroft neighborhood. A detailed study of CPTED demonstration projects reveals that 
long term actual crime rates are usually unaffected by the implementation of this sort of 
program, and the execution of such a program can meet with strong opposition and delays. 
Although CPTED has many strong supporters, it also has strong critics, who point to a 
lack of reliable evidence to demonstrate CPTED's effectiveness. An examination of crimes 
in the Bancroft neighborhood shows that a CPTED program may be ineffective against 
certain types of crimes because each crime has its own particular geography. 
There may, however, be aspects of CPTED that would be worth pursuing and 
some areas within Bancroft where implementing CPTED might be useful as part of a 
comprehensive crime reduction program. One element of CPTED, "target-hardening," 
which involves improving locks and installing alarms, was the most consistently effective 
and lasting element of the CPTED demonstration projects examined. 
An effort to implement CPTED principles in Bancroft's commercial areas may be an 
effective way to improve people's perception of those parts of the neighborhood. 
Residents' discomfort with certain areas may be disproportionately high compared to the 
actual crime rates. For instance, many residents cited the intersection of Chicago A venue 
and East 38th Street as an area they would feel uncomfortable being in at night. Yet the 
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actual number ofreported robberies that occurred in this area was quite low. Therefore 
efforts to combat vandalism and create more of an appearance of informal surveillance 
might be an effective means of reducing residents' fears about these areas. 
Crimes such as damage to automobiles and theft from automobiles may be 
effectively reduced by a neighborhood effort to change the character of alleyways. These 
crimes are arguably more "opportunistic," and they are more likely to be committed by 
people from outside the immediate area. Many of the crimes classified as burglaries within 
Bancroft are actually garage break-ins, and the only way to access garages is through the 
alleys. Therefore efforts to create the appearance of social surveillance may be effective in 
curbing this type of crime. By better maintaining alleyways and making them appear 
"semi-private" instead of "semi-public," foot traffic through these areas may be reduced 
and which will in turn reduce the number of potential offenders who are moving through 
these areas. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to critically review the concept of Crime Prevention 
Though Environmental Design (CPTED) and make recommendations on its implementation 
in Bancroft, a residential neighborhood on the south side of Minneapolis (Figure 1). 
Bancroft is bounded by Cedar A venue South and Chicago A venue South to the east and 
west, and by East 38th Street and East 42nd Street to the north and south. This report is 
designed to provide a comprehensive overview of CPTED and the Bancroft neighborhood. 
There are three sections to this report. 
In the first section, the concept of CPTED is described, including its three major 
components: "target hardening," changes to the physical environment, and "community 
building." Next, this report reviews three case studies where CPTED principles were 
implemented -- one in Hartford, Connecticut; another in Portland, Oregon; and a third in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Emphasis is placed on the techniques used, and on 
implementation and effectiveness of the program. The last portion of this section examines 
criticisms of CPTED. 
The second section focuses on the Bancroft neighborhood. First, a brief 
description of the neighborhood based on information from the 1990 census familiarizes 
readers with the area. The neighborhood is looked at in a city-wide context in terms of its 
transportation system and population. The report then focuses on residents' attitudes 
towards crime in the neighborhood, which includes information from informal 
conversations with residents as well as surveys and interviews. Lastly, the second section 
looks at reported incidents of crimes in Bancroft based on data gathered from the 
Minneapolis Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit. The objectives of looking at these 
data are to examine the spatial pattern of the reported incidents and make recommendations 
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for the implementation of crime-prevention strategies based on the distribution of crimes in 
the study area. 
The third and final section of this report contains recommendations for 
implementing CPTED in the Bancroft neighborhood. The Bancroft Neighborhood 
Association (BNA) should consider executing these recommendations as part of its plan for 
the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP). Included in this section are 
recommendations to implement "target hardening" measures and for improving commercial 
areas and alleyways in Bancroft. 
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I. CPTED: Concept and Evaluation 
CPTED differs from traditional crime control in that it focuses not on the 
apprehension and prosecution of offenders, but on preventing the occurrence of crime. 
The concepts behind CPTED originated from the work of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman. 
Jacobs, in her book The Death and Life of Great American Cities, put forth the notion that 
the more "eyes on the street" in a particular location, the less likely it will be that a crime 
will be committed there. Newman in his book Defensible Space, discussed how an 
individual's sense of territoriality could be enhanced by the surrounding architecture. 
Given a greater sense of ownership or control, people would theoretically be more likely to 
protect their property and potential offenders would be inhibited by an area's "sense of 
place." 
CPTED has three basic components, "target hardening," changes to the physical 
environment, and changes to the social environment (community building). Target 
hardening refers to methods of making a "target" of a crime less accessible to potential 
offenders using locks, alarm systems and security cameras. Changes in the physical 
environment include a variety of methods that are designed to change both the behavior of 
people who live in the area and how outsiders perceive the area. "Community building" 
refers to the process of strengthening the ties between individuals and organizations in an 
area. 
This report examines three different attempts to implement CPTED principles. The 
first took place in a residential neighborhood called Asylum Hill in Hartford, Connecticut. 
This project focused mainly on changing the physical layout of the streets to make it less 
accessible to through traffic. The program also included initiatives to strengthen ties 
between the local police unit and the neighborhood as well as reinforcing local community 
organizations. The second project was implemented on a commercial corridor known as 
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Union Avenue in Portland, Oregon. Attempts were made to increase the amount of activity 
on the street through changes in physical layout as well as a target-hardening campaign and 
promotional activities. The third project took place in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
focused on three different neighborhoods using a combination of target hardening, physical 
changes to the environment, and community building. 
The CPTED concept has been criticized for several reasons. First, critics assert that 
the underlying components are poorly defined and the theories are impractical. Second, 
there is little reliable evidence proving that these methods have an effect, and in cases where 
the studies have been thorough, there is little indication that CPTED is effective in the long 
term. Third, it is argued that implementing physical changes in the environment does not 
actually reduce crime, but merely displaces it. CPTED techniques focus on reducing the 
opportunity for potential offenders to commit a crime, and may not address other factors 
which cause crime. 
Traditional Crime Control vs. CPTED 
Traditional crime control methods involve the apprehension and punishment of 
offenders. The premise behind this method is that criminals will be either rehabilitated 
through punishment or they will be kept away from the rest of society and prevented from 
doing further harm. The response to increased levels of ~rime, therefore, is to put more 
police officers on the streets, toughen sentences for offenders and build more prisons 
(Crowe, 16-18). 
This traditional approach to controlling crime does not, however, fully address the 
crime problem. It addresses the punishment aspect of crime, not the prevention. Although 
the presence of police officers in a particular area may prevent an offense from occurring 
there, it is impossible to have a police officer patrolling every part of the city every hour of 
the day. Although the prospect of incarceration and punishment in theory should deter 
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criminal offenses, there is no practical evidence to support this argument. There does not 
appear to be a correlation between the number of prisons built or tougher sentencing and 
the occurrence of crime. More fundamentally, this approach is geared towards punishing 
crimes that have already occurred, not preventing them from happening in the first place 
(Crowe, 9-10). 
It has been argued by proponents of CPTED that crimes occur where there are 
opportunities for criminal acts. If these opportunities were removed, then the number of 
incidents of crime should be reduced. Factors that create opportunities to commit crime can 
be found in both the physical and the social environment. For example, if there is 
inadequate lighting, assailants are able to conceal themselves and remain undetected by 
potential victims. Similarly, if residents of an area are unfamiliar with each other and 
avoid questioning strangers about their reasons for being in that area, persons with criminal 
intent can move freely without being detected. 
The Origins of CPTED 
Jane Jacobs, in her 1961 book The Death and Life of Great American Cities, first 
proposed the notion of crime control through environmental design. Jacobs found a 
correlation between the number of incidents and how many "eyes on the street" there are in 
a location. Criminal activity c~uld be deterred not only by police officers, but also by the 
presence of ordinary citizens who might report suspicious or criminal activity to authorities. 
The more diverse a location is in terms of its activities and uses, the more likely this sort of 
informal social control will occur. Areas that are relatively deserted experience higher 
crime rates because the likelihood that an offender will be observed or caught is 
diminished. It is also true, however, that an area can experience such a high volume of 
traffic that potential offenders can move about anonymously without fear of being 
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questioned. In order to create the impression of "eyes on the street," the following things 
should be done: 
• Buildings should be oriented toward the street 
• Clear distinctions should be made between public and private spaces. 
• Activities that are seen as unsafe should be placed in areas perceived as safe. Safe 
activities should be placed in unsafe areas. For instance, automatic teller machines 
should be relocated from areas that are isolated to places where there is a substantial 
amount of human activity or a community park could be placed in an area where there 
are a number of abandoned buildings. 
• Each area should have multiple users who use the area at different times so it is always 
under surveillance. 
Oscar Newman, an architect, continued research similar to Jacobs. In his 1972 
book Defensible Space, he discussed how people's latent "territoriality" could be fostered 
through changes in the physical environment. The notion that humans display territoriality 
similar to how animals demarcate and defend their territory was popularized by Robert 
Ardey in the mid-1960s (Murray, 108). According to Newman, territoriality could be used 
to create informal social surveillance, leading people to take steps necessary to protect their 
rights and property. Ways to create informal social surveillance include the creation of real 
and symbolic barriers, or as Jacobs suggested, creating opportunities for residential 
surveillance. Newman was also interested in how proper design could alter the visual 
impact of a neighborhood or housing project. Run-down, neglected areas appear more 
vulnerable to potential offenders. In his study, Newman showed how public housing 
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projects worked against the creation of "defensible space" by dividing residents and 
creating spaces that were actually conducive to criminal activity. 
Components of CPTED 
Although the concept of environmental design as a deterrent to crime was originally 
based in physical modifications to the environment, most CPTED programs usually involve 
three basic components: target hardening, changes to the physical environment, and 
changes to the social environment or community building. Target hardening refers to 
methods of making a "target" of a crime less accessible to potential offenders. Changes in 
the physical environment include a variety of methods designed to influence perceptions of 
an area by both people who live there and by outsiders. Community building refers to the 
process of strengthening ties between and among individuals and organizations in an area. 
"Target Hardening" 
"Target hardening" refers to making a "target," or potential objectives of the 
criminal, more difficult to obtain, and usually refers to burglary-related crimes. No matter 
how much a target is "hardened," almost any target can be penetrated (Rubenstein, 15). 
There are three main devices used for "target hardening:" improved locks, alarm systems, 
and security cameras. Improving the quality of locks can be an effective deterrent to 
residential burglary. It is especially important in areas that lack adequate security devices. 
In many cases, a criminal does not have to overcome a security device to enter the 
residence. In other instances, the current locks being used may be inadequate. They are 
either weak or easily broken. 
Another method for deterring criminals is through alarm systems. An alarm system 
alerts neighbors to the fact a home has been broken into. Even if the perpetrator does not 
immediately flee, it does limit the time he or she has available to take anything of value 
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because they know the police could arrive at any moment. Without an alarm system a 
criminal is much less limited by time. A survey of existing studies shows that alarms can 
have a significant impact on attempted crimes and that arrests associated with sites with 
alarm systems are significantly higher (Rubenstein, 18-19). Security cameras are also an 
option, and have been shown to also increase the likelihood that a criminal is apprehended 
in a commercial setting. They are usually of limited value to residences (Rubenstein, 20-
21 ). One experiment in which a security system was placed in a large apartment building 
showed that few tenants used the equipment and crime failed to decrease (DuBow, 42). 
Both alarms and security cameras can be prohibitively expensive for residences. 
Another approach is "target removal," that is to reduce the objective of the criminal. 
For example, one effective way to prevent vandalism in a public area is to eliminate targets 
that cannot stand up to damage (Poyner, 60). 
Changes in the Physical Environment 
The second component of CPTED involves changes to the physical environment of 
a location. These changes are intended to have the effect of either reducing the likelihood 
that a crime will be committed or increase the likelihood the offender will be caught 
(Clarke, 139). The physical features of an area that increase a potential target's 
vulnerability to attack are altered and attempts are made to influence how both legitimate 
users and potential offenders perceive an area. 
One of the most collllI1;only addressed aspects of the physical environment is 
lighting. Lighting is seen as a deterrent to night-time crimes. The underlying idea is that 
people will not only feel safer in well-lit areas because potential assailants will be unable to 
easily conceal themselves, but potential offenders will avoid the risk of committing a crime 
if they are more likely to be seen (Crowe, 29-30). Although there is a strong indication that 
increased lighting decreases the fear of crime, there is no statistically significant evidence 
that street lighting affects the actual level of crime. Most evidence supporting street lighting 
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as a deterrent to crime is based on untested opinions of police officers (Tien 47, 93). 
"Immediate but short-lived reductions were occasionally observed, but evidence of 
permanent improvement have proved elusive" (Murray, 113). 
Features that give potential offenders the ability to hide themselves should be 
removed. One study showed that 65% of rapes occur in small confined areas with cover 
from dense vegetation, walls or fences (Fisher, Nasar, 39). Potential offenders desire a 
hiding place from which they can await, attack, and take a victim out of sight. Offenders 
look for areas with a high degree of potential refuge for themselves, but a low prospect of 
escape for the victim. What makes an area dangerous are "blind spots," or "lurk lines," 
beyond a potential victim's line of sight. These types of areas include places with dense 
foliage, sharp bends in passageways, or fences (Fisher, Nasar, 38-39; Warr, 894). 
Burglars also often take into account the amount of "cover" available, that is how obscured 
a residence is from public view by trees, shrubs, fences and other factors that would allow 
them to approach a building while remaining out of sight (Hope, 47-50). 
Changes that affect how legitimate users and potential offenders perceive an area 
either increase the amount social surveillance in an area or help to foster a sense of 
territoriality in residents. Changes that increase the amount of social surveillance in an area 
of an area involve creating more opportunities for legitimate uses for the area. This idea is 
similar to Jacob's notions of designating multiple uses to an area that attract activity at 
different times during the day and putting safe activities in unsafe areas and placing unsafe 
activities in safe areas. These changes can be made through the improvement or creation of 
walkways and public spaces such as parks. Changes should be designed to increase the 
density of people on the street, and as a result there will be more "eyes on the street." 
Another tactic is to reduce the amount of unassigned open space, such as converting an 
empty lot into a community activity space. However, in some cases, the introduction of a 
new land use may have a negative affect of the surrounding area. The creation of a 
neighborhood school, for instance, because it increases the amount of pedestrian and 
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vehicle traffic, may reduce the "controlling and challenging behaviors of residents (e.g. 
staring and verbal challenges)" (Crowe, 148). This negative affect may be curbed by 
separating the residential area with entrance narrowing devices, walls or columns (Crowe, 
153). 
The perception that social surveillance exists may be created by making sure an area 
is cared for and that opportunities for monitoring the area by residents are visible to 
outsiders. One way to show that an area is cared for by the community is to create a garden 
plot that is maintained by residents. It is believed that regular maintenance of an area and 
the rapid attention to damage can reduce the amount of vandalism that occurs because 
potential offenders fear they will be caught (Poyner, 60). Areas where buildings do not 
face the street, or without windows looking out onto the sidewalk, are thought to be more 
susceptible to crime. Without the potential for being seen by someone inside, illegal 
activity may flourish on the street (Crowe, 45-46; Poyner, 10; Warr, 891). 
An example of how differences in the physical environment can affect people's 
sense of territoriality comes out of Oscar Newman's studies of public housing complexes. 
Newman found that the larger the number of apartments that form an identifiable group 
within the building, the stronger the sense of "cohesion" among residents. This cohesion 
would result in tenants being more likely to solve problems together. In contrast, when 
there are a greater the number of apartments per floor, this sense of cohesion is affected 
negatively (Rubenstein, 46-47). 
One CPTED technique that makes an area less vulnerable as well as increases social 
surveillance and residents' sense of territoriality involves changing the physical layout of an 
area. Spaces are redesigned so that there is less traffic through an area (and therefore less 
potential off enders) and people unfamiliar with the area encounter difficulty moving 
through it without being detected. A method used to accomplish this objective involves 
changing the street plan from a regular grid pattern to a less predictable pattern. The new 
designs tend to use cul-de-sacs or return-loop layout patterns that prevent through traffic 
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(Poyner, 15). Streets may also be narrowed at the entryway to a neighborhood to act as a 
symbolic gate. People entering an area may be required to pass through a control point 
(Crowe, 153). Changes in the street layout can make it more difficult for someone 
unfamiliar with the neighborhood to move around without appearing disoriented. 
Residents will then be able to identify non-legitimate users and question their presence. 
The reduction of traffic and noise may also encourage more interaction among residents and 
increase social cohesion (Poyner, 18). Oscar Newman discussed the benefits of private 
streets in his book "The Private Streets of St. Louis." In his view, where streets had been 
privatized and residents made legally responsible for the care and maintenance of their 
streets, there was less through pedestrian and vehicular traffic as well as more of a sense of 
living in a distinct and separate area (Poyner, 15-17). 
Community Building 
The third element of CPTED involves changes in the social environment, or 
"community building." These sorts of changes can have the most impact upon how people 
perceive the livability of their neighborhood. Community-building attempts to increase 
residents' sense of ownership of the neighborhood and to.make them more conscious of 
who their neighbors are and who does not belong in their neighborhood. It is believed by 
proponents of CPTED that people will then be more likely to intervene in suspicious 
situations and question individuals who appear to lack a legitimate purpose for being in 
their neighborhood. This intervention should aid in the apprehension of criminals and 
reduce successful crime, and also reduce attempted crime. 
Community building techniques can consist of social events such as local fairs 
designed to increase the amount of contact between individuals in the neighborhood and to 
improve their familiarity with each other. A housing rehabilitation loan program will not 
only improve property values, but will also change the "look and feel" of an area, and that 
will affect the an outsider's perception of the community. Community building techniques 
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can also be used as vehicles to implement other aspects of CPTED. For instance, an "alley 
clean up day" will not only foster a sense of pride in residents, but it will also affect how an 
area is perceived by making it less unsightly. 
Another common community building technique is to foster more contact and 
dialogue between residents and the local police force. In some cases new police sub-
stations have been created, or patrol routes have been modified Police officers may be 
involved in CPTED related activities, such as block clubs or a target hardening campaign. 
Examples of CPTED 
To understand further how CPTED can be used as a crime prevention technique, 
this report examines three separate case studies. All three were conducted by a federal 
organization known as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) during the 
1970s. The purpose of these projects was to demonstrate CPTED techniques. The LEAA 
is now known as the National Institute of Justice. Because a variety of techniques were 
used in all three cases, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the effectiveness of any 
one technique. Because of the nature of this type of study the luxury of conducting 
laboratory type experiments to isolate the different effects of variables is absent. 
In addition to allowing us to examine the effectiveness of CPTED, these case 
studies offer a chance to see how CPTED principles have been implemented in different 
areas, and allow us a sense of how these ideas might look in practice. The studies can also 
be examined to see what sort of difficulties can be expected in the implementation of 
CPTED project. 
Hartford, Connecticut 
One of the most comprehensive attempts to implement CPTED took place in 
Hartford, Connecticut in a neighborhood known as Asylum Hill. Asylum Hill is located 
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(Figure 2) near the retail and commercial center of the city, and in 1973, consisted mainly 
of single, working individuals, young and old. A large percent of the neighborhood 
population was transient and there was a growing minority population. The housing in 
Asylum Hill was mainly low-rise apartment houses or two and three family homes. It had 
once been considered a desirable area to live in but was beginning to show signs of decline 
(Poyner, 18). 
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Figure 2: Asylum Hill: Hartford, Connecticut 
Source: Poyner, Barry. Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space. London ; 
Boston: Butterworths, 1983. 
Hartford was chosen by the LEAA as a demonstration project using environmental 
design concepts for three reasons. First, it had neighborhoods with high crime rates that 
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were considered representative of other neighborhoods nationwide. An organization 
known as the "Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice" already existed and had a 
good working relationship with city officials, the police department and the business 
community. There was also interest from the public and private sector in making capital 
improvements in the city. The project eventually focused on Asylum Hill because of its 
high crime rate, its suitable geographic size, and because the area coincided with census 
tract boundaries (Fowler, 2-3). 
There were three major components of the Asylum Hill plan, including physical 
changes to the environment, improved police strategies and community building activities. 
The main physical changes in the Asylum Hill were inexpensive changes in the public 
streets that would restrict non-resident vehicular traffic through the area and channel most 
of the through traffic onto two major streets (Figure 3). These changes would prevent 
through-traffic from dominating the residential streets so that residents would no longer feel 
uncomfortable utilizing outdoor spaces. The dominance of through traffic created an 
environment where residents avoided outdoor activity and potential offenders felt there was 
little danger of being caught if they committed a crime. Changes were made by blocking or 
narrowing key intersections and converting streets into one-ways. In addition to limiting 
traffic, these street changes visually defined the boundaries of the area. In order to test 
whether or not physical changes were effective, they were made only to the north half of 
Asylum Hill. The other two elements of the program, community policing and efforts to 
strengthen local organizations, were applied to all of Asylum Hill (Fowler, 7-9; 39-41). 
The objective of the police strategy was to create an effective neighborhood-
centered team. The unit would be relatively autonomous so it could create its own 
strategies to better serve and work with the residents of Asylum Hill. In addition to that, 
the local department would collect data on the neighborhood. In order to promote 
community building, the LEAA project sought to find existing community organizations 
and help promote them (Fowler, 45-49). 
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Adapted from Poyner, Barry. Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space. London; 
Boston: Butterworths, 1983. 
Figure 3: Changes Made in North Asylum Hill 
Several problems were encountered in implementing this program. Implementation 
of the physical changes met with resistance from the community. Adjustments to the 
original plan had to be made to get approval from the residents, who were concerned with 
the inconvenience that changes would present. Some residents wished to avoid having to 
drive farther to get to and from their homes, while others wished to avoid having to walk 
farther to the bus, which had initially been planned to be rerouted. Service providers were 
concerned about the effect of the changes on their ability to do their work. Emergency 
service providers were especially concerned that the cul-de-sacs would reduce the speed at 
which they were able to respond. Local merchants were concerned that diverting traffic 
flows would adversely affect their business, and even filed a lawsuit to prevent the city 
from implementing the plan. The idea of using "knock-down" barriers was abandoned in 
favor of the use of curbing and traffic signs. When the plan did go forward, it was with 
the understanding that if residents found the changes to be unacceptable, they would be 
removed after six months. Problems were also encountered with the financing of the 
physical changes (Fowler, 75-78). 
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In. the period immediately after the implementation of the project in Asylum Hill, the 
crime rate for burglaries fell in both parts of Asylum Hill, while continuing to rise in the 
areas just outside the study area and the city as a whole (Table 1). In the years before the 
implementation of the project, crime rates had been rising in both North and South Asylum 
Hill. These changes would appear to suggest that the CPTED program had an effect on 
reducing crime in the area. Furthermore, north Asylum Hill experienced a substantially 
larger decrease than did the southern portion of the neighborhood. The evidence for 
robbery and purse-snatchings is less conclusive, showing a substantial rise in the robbery 
rate after the conclusion of the program in the southern portion of the neighborhood, while 
the northwest adjacent area, which was not a part of the CPTED program, remained stable 
(Table 2). 
Table 1: Burglary Victimization by Area (rates per 100 households) 
i 
1973 
North Asylum Hill 7.5 
South Asylum Hill 2.2 
North and west adjacent area 8.2 
Total City 9.8 
Before 
Program 
C 1 ed omoet 
1975 
14.8 
4.6 
10.2 
12.1 
1976 
18.4 
7.8 
: 
NA 
NA 
After 
Program 
C 1 d omn ete 
1977 
10.6 
7.7 
13.7 
15.3 
Sou~ce: Fowler, Floyd J, McCalla, Mary Ellen and Thomas W. Mangione. Reducing 
Reszd~ntial Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program. 
Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1979. 
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Table 2: Robbery/Purse-snatch Victimization by Area (rates per 100 
persons) 
1973 
North Asylum Hill 2.7 
South Asylum Hill .8 
North and west adiacent area 2.0 
Total City 1.0 
Before 
Program 
C 1 ed omuet 
1975 
3.6 
4.1 
2.0 
2.1 
1976 
5.1 
3.6 
NA 
NA 
After 
Program 
C 1 ed omn et 
1977 
3.7 
7.9 
2.2 
6.5 
Source: Fowker, Floyd J, McCalla, Mary Ellen and Thomas W. Mang10ne. Reducing 
Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program. 
Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1979. 
A second evaluation of the Hartford program was done in 1979, two years after the 
first evaluation. Using the same source of survey data on victimization, it was found that 
the crime levels had returned to the levels that would be expected if nothing had been done 
at all. Fear of crime also had not been reduced, although it was lower than in other areas of 
the city. It was found, however, that informal "social surveillance" was continuing. 
People would more frequently walk around the neighborhood and believed it was easier to 
identify strangers or suspicious activity (Poyner, 21). 
Portland 
Another program that was implemented by the LEAA took place in Portland, 
Oregon. This project focused more on CPTED in commercial areas, concentrating its 
efforts on a three and half mile long, four block wide section of the Union A venue Corridor 
·j 
(UAC). Union Avenue is a north-south thoroughfare located in northeastern Portland just 
across the Williamette River from the main downtown area of the city (Figure 4). At the 
time of the project, which was implemented from 1974 through 1978, the UAC consisted 
of light industry as well as a variety of retail and service establishments, including used car 
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dealerships, banks, fast-food restaurants, gas stations and drug stores. The surrounding 
neighborhood varied in quality of housing and consisted of a moderate- to low-income and 
racially-mixed population. At the time, about half of Portland's black population lived in 
the general north-northeast area surrounding the UAC (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 5-7). 
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Figure 4: Northeastern Portland 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey. Portland Quadrangle Topographic Map. 1:24,000 scale. 
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In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the UAC was a thriving commercial strip, but two 
factors had contributed to its decline. First, by the 1950s, traffic running north-south had 
been routed away from the strip by Interstate 5. Second, the UAC now had to compete 
with large suburban shopping malls beginning in 1960s. As a result, the area had begun to 
decline, and it took on a fortified appearance as businesses closed and predatory crime 
increased. By 1974, crime rates for robbery, burglary, assault and purse-snatching were 
about three times higher in the UAC than for the city as a whole (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 
7). 
With the help of the existing Union Area Redevelopment Program and the Portland 
Police Bureau's Crime Prevention Unit, the UAC project included the following strategies 
' 
as part of their CPTED project (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 23-28): 
• The creation of a residential activity center, mini plazas and the designation of Knott 
Street as a "Safe Street for People," which involved physical redesign of streets and 
intersections as well as improved lighting and massive road improvements on Union 
Avenue. 
• Corridor Promotion -- including planned community events, such as clean-up days and 
open-air markets as well as organization and support of the business and residential 
communities and economic development 
• Improved Transportation -- including upgrades to the bus waiting areas and providing 
special public transportation for the elderly and handicapped. 
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• Security Advisor Services -- a full-time security advisor would be hired who would 
conduct security surveys and recommend appropriate "target hardening" techniques to 
participating businesses and residents. 
• Increased Law Enforcement -- similar to the Hartford plan, provisions in the UAC 
proposal called for improved police patrols and a revision of patrol district boundaries. 
In addition a storefront police precinct would be designated for the area. 
• "Cash off the Streets" Program -- a campaign to actively discourage people from 
carrying currency and advertising this policy to potential purse-snatchers and robbers. 
Westinghouse did an internal evaluation of the program shortly following its 
implementation. Commercial and residential security surveys, the installation of high 
intensity and infill street lighting, the creation of a Safe Streets for People, installation of 
new bus shelters with good opportunities for surveillance, the organization and support of 
the business community, and the planning of community events were all implemented 
within the demonstration period. Other proposed improvements, however, were not 
implemented. These included an eighty unit housing project for the elderly, linked to 
Union A venue by a redesigned, safe street; a $4.5 million road improvement program; and 
the location of new businesses in corridor (Kushmuk and Whitmore 28-32). 
The study also showed that while commercial and residential burglary decreased, 
there were few changes i,n other types of crime, such as commercial robbery and street 
crime (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 42-47). There was no evidence that crime had been 
[, 
"displaced" from Union Avenue to the surrounding area. Nor did the street lighting 
program show a reduction of crime. There was also little evidence that there were more 
residents using the area, especially the "Safe Street for People," which was meant to 
indicate a decreased fear of crime. To the contrary, surveys indicated Union Avenue was 
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still perceived to have a high crime rate (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 49). On the other hand, 
business owners had increased confidence in the future of the area and the security advisor 
had proven to be the one CPTED strategy that was fully implemented was having a lasting 
effect (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 57-60). 
Minneapolis- Willard-Homeward, Lowry Hill East, and Hawthorne 
The base of another LEAA project--the Minneapolis program, which took place 
during the mid-1970s, developed from a grant to the Governor's Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Control which designed a program for three Minneapolis neighborhoods: 
Whittier, Lowry Hill East and the Hawthorne Neighborhood (Figure 1). Meanwhile the 
Westinghouse National Issues Center had obtained a grant from the National Institute of 
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the research component of the LEAA. 
Westinghouse had chosen the Willard-Homeward neighborhood for its demonstration 
project. Although Whittier eventually dropped out of the project after receiving funds from 
the Dayton-Hudson corporation, the remaining three neighborhoods became part of a joint 
project of CPTED implementation with the goal of reducing crime and reducing the fear of 
crime (Rasmussen, 1-7). 
The evaluation of the project included the designation of not only the demonstration 
neighborhoods, but also displacement control areas in census tracts immediately 
surrounding the area and statistically similar but non-adjacent control tracts. The data used 
by the project were to come from criminal offense reports, project records, field interviews 
and surveys of residents. The criteria for selecting the neighborhoods had been that their 
crime rate was substantial, but not the highest in the city, and they also contained a variety 
of socio-ecnomic settings. The neighborhoods varied in population density, presence of 
commercial strips, homogeneity and the level of community organization (Rasmussen, 9-
18 ). 
There were to be four components of the project: 
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• Increased resident involvement through block clubs, neighborhood-watch groups and 
business associations. 
• Target-hardening projects that would include pressuring landlords to maintain minimum 
requirements to meet the city's security requirements, security surveys designed to 
detect areas vulnerable to burglars, and "Operation Identification," a campaign to 
encourage residents to mark their valuables to make them easier to identify. 
• Opportunity reduction through environmental design, which includes improvement of 
the street lighting, and change the direction of traffic flows on streets and changes in 
alley access. 
• Increased awareness of crime prevention techniques through other programs such as 
the interaction of block clubs, pamphlets and newsletters, and cooperative interaction 
between the police and the community. 
The community organizing aspect of the program met with mixed results. In 
Lowry Hill East, 97 percent of all blocks were organized and entered into the neighborhood 
watch program. In the Hawthorne neighborhood, 92 percent of the blocks were organized 
into block clubs, but only 58 percent of those participated in the neighborhood watch 
program. In Willard-Homeward, only 40 percent of the blocks were organized and only 
10 percent of those formally participated in the neighborhood watch program. While it 
promoted different families working together, the community organizing aspect resulted in 
few other changes. Residents, although they had a positive attitude towards the program, 
did not perceive that the block clubs had reduced crimes such a burglary (Rasmussen, 223-
229). 
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For the target-hardening portion of the plan, a subsidy was used as an incentive for 
people to request a security survey for their premises. A total of 266 residents from all the 
study areas had premise security surveys as a result of the crime prevention demonstration. 
A survey of those who participated indicated that the majority of them had participated as a 
result of block club meetings (Rasmussen, 65). 
Methods to reduce opportunities for crime through physical changes to the 
environment varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. In Willard-Homeward, alley 
changes were made. In one case an arm of a "T' alleyway was closed because it was 
believed that juveniles were using the dead end as a meeting place, and alleged transactions 
of stolen goods were taking place there. One arm of the alley was closed off, turning the 
"T" shape into an "L," using a natural barrier consisting of shrubs and grass. Another 
change was the installation of new lights in alleyways, replacing mercury-vapor lamps with 
high pressure sodium vapor lamps that would provide more light. Alley barricades were 
put up in front of east-west alleys immediately north of Plymouth Avenue to prevent them 
from being used as short cuts between one way streets. Other changes in Willard-
Homeward included the changing of an east-west street into a one-way street and the 
erection of traffic diverters to control the direction of traffic in the neighborhood. Traffic 
diverters were also erected in-the Hawthorne and Lowry-Hill East neighborhoods 
(Rasmussen, 78-82). 
After a year of implementation, a study was done to evaluate the program and make 
recommendations. It was found that although there were technical difficulties with 
implementing the security home surveys, residents were generally enthusiastic about the 
program. A total of 57 percent of the residents who had premise security surveys made at 
least some of the recommended changes within the project's first year. Over a third of 
those who implemented these changes would not have done so without the subsidy the 
program made available. In the first year of the program $1,931.10 was disbursed to 48 
residential participants in the subsidy program, with an average subsidy of $40.23. The 
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campaign for people to mark their valuables did not generate a response, nor was much 
action taken to increase landlord accountability because it proved impractical to implement 
(Rasmussen, 229-33). 
The evaluation of the Minneapolis project revealed that many of the physical 
changes through environmental design had not been implemented. Only minor changes 
had been implemented, and in one area, traffic diverters that had been erected were 
removed due to objections from residents. Temporary barricades were found to be too 
unsightly by residents and the report recommended against using temporary construction 
that must remain in place for a long period of time. The progress of the physical design 
aspect of the plan was also impeded by delays in preparing designs and securing 
coordination with other city departments. One program was successful. Expanding the 
role of crime-prevention block clubs to enlarge the scope of traditional alley- and spring-
clean up programs provided a visible and important role for those groups (Rasmussen, 
233). 
Criticisms of CPTED 
The concept of CPTED has been criticized for several reasons. First, the 
underlying components are poorly defined and often the theories are impractical. Second, 
there is little reliable evidence to prove that these methods are effective, and in those cases 
where the studies have been thorough, there is little indication that CPTED is effective. 
Third, it is argued that implementing physical changes in the environment does not actually 
reduce crime, but merely displaces it. 
CPTED is Poorly Defined 
Critics have raised questions about the underlying assumptions of CPTED. Oscar 
Newman's concept of territoriality has been focused on in particular. Newman is said to be 
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too metaphorical. His notion of territoriality is not clearly defined nor is it practical. Bill 
Hillier cites archeological and anthropological evidence which, he claims, discredits the 
theory that humans are "territorial" (Webb, 177-8) Ellis contends that what Newman calls 
"territoriality" cannot be explained "purely in terms of a set of responses to characteristics 
of the built form" (Webb, 178). Newman further assumes that people are willing to 
exercise a policing function and that they would take advantage of policing opportunities 
(Taylor et al., 53-67). Psychological experiments in which persons are exposed to staged 
incidents show there is a substantial gap between perceiving that a crime is taking place and 
intervening (DuBow, 49). 
Methods such as changing the street layout of an area to limit through traffic assume 
that offenders in an area are coming from outside the immediate area and are unfamiliar 
with the area they are preying on. Studies show, however, many criminals operate in areas 
close to their own residence (Repetto, 174; Murray, 118; Pyle 32-33). Burglars often have 
a sophisticated knowledge of their potential target. Burglars usually locate a target during 
the course of their daily activities and keep it under surveillance for a period of time. 
Sometimes a burglar will select a target because they know the victim personally or they 
have received a tip from someone with inside knowledge of the place (Wright, Decker, 
101). To identify a specific site to operate in, the robbers may keep contending sites under 
surveillance. This surveillance can be precise and systematic. Those engaged in detailed 
planning may even go to the trouble of renting an apartment over looking the site (Gabor et 
al, 59) 
The social surveillance rationale relies on the assumption that merely creating the 
appearance of social surveillance is enough to deter criminals. However, criminals are 
usually aware of how much surveillance is occurring. Merely creating opportunities for 
surveillance will be an ineffective crime deterrent if potential offenders believe the area is 
not actually being watched. An offender's calculations when deciding whether or not to 
commit a crime are based on the real risk of apprehension, not on symbolic barriers or the 
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appearance of social cohesion (Murray, 118). It has also not been determined if potential 
offenders actually perceive defensible space features (Murray, 110). 
One study attempted to examine the differences of race, class and income between 
high and low crime areas to discover what role social surveillance took in these 
neighborhoods. If the idea of defensible space and "territoriality" is correct, then the areas 
with lower crime rates should show more evidence of informal social control such as 
movement governing and surveillance. It was found, however, that people who lived in 
higher crime area exhibited a greater tendency to engage in informal social control, and that 
it seemed to be more indicative of a crime problem than as a means of crime prevention. 
There was also little evidence of greater social ties in low crime neighborhoods than in high 
crime neighborhoods (Greenburg et al., 1984, 117-123). 
Few Reliable Studies Supporting CPTED 
A second criticism of CPTED is that the studies done to demonstrate it as a viable 
solution to crime control have been poorly conducted, and reliable studies do not show 
significant results. 
Newman's principles of defensible space do not stand up empirically. The data is 
weak, and in many cases, "statistically non-significant" (Webb, 177) Even where 
significant results do occur there is no way to be certain that the changes were actually the 
result of the environmental changes. No study has been able to associate physical changes 
with behavioral changes (Rubenstein, 61). Studies which attempt to test the social 
surveillance and social cohesion rationales have "resulted in contradictory findings." 
Moreover, "the behavior changes predicted by the community building rationales (e.g., 
increased social cohesion) have consistently failed to appear" (Murray, 110-111). Data are 
especially lacking on offenders' perceptions. 
The methodology of many studies has also been found to be deficient. Critics point 
out that "social and socio-economic factors are not adequately controlled and that 
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Newman's use of criminal statistics is too uncritical" (Webb, 177). The data from many of 
these analyses lack comparison with previous trends and lack control groups with which to 
compare the changes made to an area. Therefore, the changes that the studies observe 
cannot be distinguished from trends that may be affecting the area as a whole, and may not 
be related to the changes in design that are implemented. For example, the analytic power 
of Kohn's implementation of Newman's defensible space principles at Clason Point and 
Markham Gardens was constrained by the fact that the physical design changes between the 
two areas were substantially different (Rubenstein, 58). Studies attempting to demonstrate 
CPTED have failed to adequately define how an individual perceives their territory and how 
their perception and behavior can be affected by design (Taylor, 53-67). 
The Displacement Phenomenon 
The third major criticism of CPTED concerns whether or not crime will simply be 
moved to other areas where no similar programs are in place. This movement is referred to 
as the "displacement phenomenon." Opponents of CPTED contend that criminals will 
shift to another time, target, place or type of crime. For instance, if police patrols are 
increased in the evening, then crimes will occur more during the afternoon. Or, if there are 
more anti-theft devices installed in homes, than burglars will switch to robbery. 
One study has indicated, however, that some crimes are so opportunistic that they 
will not simply be displaced. Even in instances where offenders are prevented from 
operating in one area, they would commit crimes in another. Limits and costs, such as 
mobility and transportation costs, will lessen their ability to do this (Davidson, 147-8). So 
for opportunistic crime, the overall rate will decline. The displacement phenomenon 
assumes that the offender population is deterministic (i.e., an offender will commit a certain 
number of crimes over a given time period regardless of the associated risks). It also 
assumes that offenders possess "total mobility in regards to crime, time, tactics, target and 
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area." This assumption ignores the fact that a crime may be opportunistic, done on impulse 
when a situation presents itself to the offender (Repetto, 169-70). 
It has also been shown that certain criminals have differing ranges. A survey of 
young burglars has shown that they tend to be bound to a small geographical area due to 
their lack of transportation and their lack of information about areas immediately outside 
their own neighborhoods. Similarly, a study of street muggers indicated that it is important 
for these individuals to know the turf on which they operate. Offenders, according to 
interviews, traveled an average of half a mile to commit each robbery. An analysis of 
offender histories showed that ninety-three percent of the offenses occurred within one and 
a half miles of the offender's residence (Repetto, 17 4 ). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the choice of the type of crime is particular to 
the individual. For instance, an offender might chose burglary because of a reluctance to 
risk a confrontation with the victim, and would not be likely to turn to robbery if 
opportunities for burglary were reduced. Likewise, juveniles committing acts of vandalism 
will not necessarily tum to some other type of offense, such as robbery. It must be kept in 
mind that the data from these studies are based on surveys of criminals who have been 
caught, and therefore may not be a representative sample. It does, however, suggest, that 
while displacement could result if CPTED principles were applied over a limited area, the 
broader the geographic scope of the project, the more likely it is to have an impact 
(Repetto, 17 5-77). 
Other Limitations of CPTED 
CPTED is based on the notion that crime is the result of opportunity. There are, 
however, many other theories on what causes crime. CPTED may have some effect on 
crime in an area, but it does not address other issues that influence crime. 
The focus of CPTED is the reduction of the opportunity to commit crimes. 
However, it should be kept in mind that there may be many other factors involved in what 
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motivates an individual to be involved in criminal activity. Criminal behavior has also been 
attributed as being a cultural rite of passage for adolescent boys seeking manhood, the clash 
of a dominant culture with a disenfranchised subculture, and a learned behavior that is 
transmitted from one generation to the next as a way of life. Crime can be seen as the 
actions of individuals who justify their behavior on their own moral terms and also as a 
type of behavior that can be correlated geographically with socio-economic variables such 
as poverty, illiteracy and occupation (Pyle et al, 10-22). Another perspective on 
neighborhood design and crime suggests that the effects of physical design of buildings, 
sites and neighborhoods on crime are less important than the degree of access of potential 
offenders and the supply of potential targets and witnesses, as opposed to informal social 
surveillance (Greenburg, Rohe; 1984, 49-50). 
A CPTED program if implemented may influence some factors that may cause 
crime, but it would not address other factors such as the economic situation of an area, the 
lack of investment in infrastructure and the absence of sources of income for an area's 
residents. A CPTED program would not address the long-term trends that affect a small 
area. The Portland project provides a good example. The initial reasons attributed to 
Union A venue's decline were changing patterns of commuting and retailing (Kushmuk and 
Whitmore, 7). While the negative reputation and the neglect of maintenance contributed to 
a spiraling pattern of dis-investment, it was far from the only contributing factor. A CPTED 
program is meant to prevent crime in a localized context and cannot be expected to reduce 
the overall crime rate dramatically. It may reduce the danger level of a particular site, but it 
does not affect the overall crime situation. 
Some CPTED programs also suffer from a "Field of Dreams" mentality--an "if you 
build it, they will come," attitude towards preventing crime through informal social 
surveillance. The Portland example again provides an example of this phenomenon. The 
creation of a "Safe Street for People" on the Union Avenue Corridor did not meet the 
expectations of its proponents, who believed it would attract more local people to the area 
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and consequently appear to be more safe. While the project was completed, it did not 
attract residents who still felt it was dangerous to use the area 
The projects that were implemented in Hartford, Portland and Minneapolis 
demonstrate that implementing a CPTED program can be costly and time consuming, and 
often the results can be minimal or only short term. The.required financing for all these 
projects came from outside sources such as the federal government or a large corporation. 
The process was slow, and the proposals met with opposition from a variety of sources, 
some of which severely curtailed the implementation of the project 
Summary of CPTED 
CPTED differs from traditional crime prevention techniques because it attempts to 
prevent crimes rather than focus on the apprehension and punishment for crimes that have 
already been committed. The objective is to modify the environment in ways that reduce 
opportunities to commit crimi_nal acts. 
CPTED originates from early theories about how informal social surveillance, or 
"eyes of the street," affect the perceived safety of an area and from beliefs that the physical 
layout of a space could invoke latent territoriality within people that would lead to informal 
surveillance of an area. Most CPTED programs involve three basic components, including 
target hardening, physical changes to the environment and community building. CPTED 
principles have been implemented in three separate projects by the LEAA in Hartford, 
Portland and Minneapolis. In examining the results of these programs and literature 
reviews of CPTED literature, it appears that target hardening is the most effective crime 
prevention strategy. The physical-design aspect of these programs proved to be difficult to 
implement because of lack of funds and local opposition. Furthermore there is little 
evidence that these activities reduce crime in an area for any substantial period of time. 
Community-building activities have been shown to have mixed results. Although local 
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newspapers and other media were effectively used in the Minneapolis program to raise the 
awareness of crime issues (Rasmussen, 84-86), attempts to promote activity in Portland 
seemed to have stalled not long after the demonstration period (Kushmuk and Whitmore, 
32). Technical difficulties were encountered with having police work more closely with the 
neighborhood, but these provisions of the plan seemed to be more stable than the physical 
changes that were made. 
The concepts underlying CPTED, such as social surveillance and territoriality are 
poorly defined and often based on false assumptions (i.e., that people will intervene if they 
see a crime in progress). There is also little evidence to show that CPTED programs are 
effective in reducing the crime rate of an area. Studies conducted on the subject employed 
poor methodology or produced inconclusive results. A third criticism of CPTED is the 
possibility that CPTED merely displaces crime and does not reduce it. However, the 
"displacement phenomenon" may not be that great a problem because of the limited 
mobility of criminals and the particular nature of different crimes. CPTED is based solely 
on preventing the opportunity for crime, so it only addresses site specific concerns, and 
will not affect the overall crime situation or other conditions that may lead to individual 
criminal behavior. 
Ultimately, although CPTED is a different approach to reducing crime rates, it is by 
no means a cure-all solution. While target hardening methods have been shown to be an 
effective method of reducing crimes, changes in the physical and social environment have 
not been proven effective. A CPTED program, if implemented, will probably not 
dramatically affect the actual occurrence of crime. It may however, have an important 
impact on how people perceive crime in an area. If people's fear of crime in an area is 
disproportionately high compared with how much crime is actually occurring, a CPTED 
program could have an impact on the quality of life of its residents. 
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II. The Bancroft Neighborhood 
Background on the Neighborhood 
Population Characteristics 
Bancroft is a mostly residential neighborhood located in South Minneapolis 
between East 38th Street and East 42nd and Chicago A venue and Cedar A venue. It is 
named after Geo. Bancroft School, an elementary school located on 38th Street between 
13th and 14th A venues. In 1990, it had a population of 3,377 people, which is a slight 
decrease from its 1980 population of 3,539 (Bancroft Neighborhood: Planning Information 
Base, 1-5). 
Figure 5: Housing in Bancroft, Chicago Avenue 
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The neighborhood is zoned primarily for single family homes, with zones of higher 
density development allowed along Chicago Avenue, Cedar Avenue and East 38th Street as 
well as in an area occupied by a shopping center and several nearby apartment blocks on 
Bloomington A venue. There are no industrial districts within Bancroft (Bancroft 
Neighborhood: Planning Information Base, 16-17). 
The majority of the population in Bancroft is white, with large numbers of residents 
counting German, Swedish, Norwegian or Irish among their ancestries. Over 18 percent 
of the population is comprised of minorities, with over 13 percent of these African-
Americans. This amount is a substantial increase from the 1980 minority population, 
which was just under 12 percent of the total population (Census of Population and 
Housing). 
Currently, 1,862 people (55%) of Bancroft's population are in the labor force. 
The most prevalent types of employment include workers involved in health services, 
retail, FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) and other professional and related services. 
The median household income in 1989 was $31,672. Only 5.5 percent of the total 
population in Bancroft lives below the poverty level. Just over 7 .5 percent of the labor 
force was unemployed in 1989. The majority of Bancroft's population commutes to work 
by car. Over 69 percent of workers over 16 years old drove and almost 10 percent used car 
pools. Over 13 percent used public transportation and just over 6 percent worked at home 
or walked to their destination. The mean travel time to work for the working population 
was 19 minutes (Census of Population and Housing). 
The majority of the housing units in the neighborhood were built prior to 1940 and 
are single family homes with two to three bedrooms. They are, for the most part, oriented 
east-west along the north-south streets of the neighborhoods. Typically, garages are 
detached from the main house and are set back in an alley that is used communally by a 
block. Bancroft is located in an area that is a transition zone between apartments to the 
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north and single family homes to the south (Bancroft Neighborhood: Planning Information 
Base). 
Location Relative to the Rest of the City 
Housing in Bancroft initially developed along the extension of the street car lines 
from the central city. In their book Where We Live: The Residential Districts of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Judith Martin and David Lanegran classified Bancroft as part of 
the "settled Mid-City zone." These areas have never been the home of the elite, but has 
been the home of middle-class families and are "the proverbial nice older neighborhoods." 
The neighborhoods in this category lack the spectacular houses founded in other older 
districts of the city, and are therefore more susceptible to change. These areas have in 
general maintained their character because of features that attract middle-class families such 
as excellent designs, proximity to public transportation or amenities such as parks, lakes, 
or other recreational facilities. 
Like many of the other areas in the settled mid-city district, Bancroft is bounded by 
busy streets that were once streetcar lines. Commercial sites originally developed near 
intersections of street car lines to take advantage of the business generated by streetcar 
riders. However, the development of a strip mall on Bloomington obviously took place 
after the automobile became the dominant mode of transportation. The presence of the 
parking lot at the mall indicates an attempt to integrate the automobile into the old streetcar-
based landscape. 
Chicago, Cedar and Bloomington avenues have continued to be heavy traffic 
generators. These streets experience high volumes of traffic relative to the surrounding 
residential streets as they act as collector and arterial streets for the whole transportation 
network . They also continue to be routes for public transportation, although the street car 
has been replaced by the MCTO bus. There are 6 routes that pass through Bancroft or the 
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streets that border the neighborhood, including the 5,14, 22, 23, express routes, as well as 
University of Minnesota shuttle, which is contracted independently . 
Perceptions of Crime in Bancroft 
Informal interviews and a survey of Bancroft residents by the author indicated that 
crime within the neighborhood is not a major concern of most residents. While some 
residents have had experiences with burglaries or thefts from their cars, they did not feel 
that it was anything out of the ordinary or that crime in Bancroft was any worse than in 
other part of Minneapolis. 
As part of a survey conducted for this report, residents were asked to indicate on a 
map of the Bancroft neighborhood areas they felt were unsafe using black dots. Many 
residents tended to place their dots on the outer edge of the neighborhood. The most 
frequently indicated area of concern was the intersection of East 38th Street and Chicago 
A venue. Residents also cited areas of concern along the other major arterial streets that 
bound the neighborhood, and a few indicated concern about the local strip mall on 
Bloomington A venue. 
While filling out this survey, residents cited the presence of individuals who 
appeared only to be "hanging out." There was concern about the level of activity and the 
amount of traffic that passed through the area. Also, areas were frequently identified based 
on reputation or an incident that had recently occurred at the site, such as a shooting. 
Residents who expressed concerns about certain areas, such as 38th and Chicago admitted 
they often did not visit that area, and that their perceptions were based largely on passing 
through the intersection on their way to and from home. One resident, however, said that 
he often went to businesses located on 38th and Chicago because he lived near that area, 
and did not think that it was really a "problem area." 
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Figure 6: The Intersection of East 38th Street and Chicago A venue South 
One concern that many residents voiced was about absentee landlords who do not 
keep up their property and do not properly screen their tenants. This lack of maintenance, 
according to residents, is allowing undesirable elements into the neighborhood, and 
perhaps even attracting them. Many residents also felt that there is too much rental housing 
in the neighborhood. 
Interviews 
As part of this study, interviews were conducted with four local business owners 
and a member of the staff from Bancroft school in order to find out what their perceptions 
were of crime in the area. The people interviewed included Tom Perez, who owns Tom's 
Furniture at the comer of 38th and Chicago; Carol Simdom, who operates Nokomis Lanes, 
a bowling alley located on Bloomington A venue; Bev Munsen, the owner of "What's 
Cooking," a restaurant also located on Bloomington Avenue; Brian Peterson, who owns 
Peterson Hardware on the comer of Bloomington and 38th; and Jane Ellis, who is the 
Assistant Principal at Bancroft School. All of those interviewed felt that crime was not a 
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large problem in the neighborhood. All of them had previously been involved in efforts to 
prevent crime and were positive towards implementing so.me sort of change in the physical 
environment. 
Tom Perez 
Tom Perez has been operating Tom's Furniture at the comer of 38th and Chicago 
for seven years. Tom himself lives in Richfield and has lived there for the past five years. 
Prior to that he lived near 60th and Chicago. He says his store has a fairly wide 
distribution of customers. About 50 percent of his customers come from Minneapolis and 
about fifty percent come from the suburbs. 
Perez says he has had "his share of problems, especially over the summer." He 
cited gang related shootings at the comer, especially during the summer, as a concern. He 
hears a lot of concerns from customers who come, especially when they're asking for 
directions to find the store. When he mentions that the store is at the comer of 38th an 
Chicago customers often ask "wasn't there a shooting there?" Perez also says there has 
been "lots of' graffiti by the bus stop. He is also concerned about the presence of young 
kids. 
Perez would like to see more police, especially on Lake Street. He thinks police 
take too long to respond to calls, and as a result criminals feel they can get away with a 
certain amount of activity. Perez says he would likely intervene by calling to police if he 
saw any suspicious activity at the comer, but he would not get involved himself. 
Crime prevention steps Perez has taken include installing an alarm system that goes 
directly to the police station and installing extra lighting at the bus stop with funds from 
MCTO. MCTO installed the lighting and pays the monthly power bill. 
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Carol Simdorn 
Carol Simdorn has been operating Nokomis Lanes at the Bloomington strip mall for 
over 15 years. She herself lives on 44th and 28th, near Lake Hiawatha. As far as she is 
concerned, crime is all over the cities, north and south, and not in any one particular 
location. Overall, Bancroft is not any worse than any other part of the cities. Carol says 
she has had some problems in the parking lot. She also says some of her customers "think 
its rough to come here." 
Simdorn would like to see more police coming around and going through the 
neighborhood, but there need to be more police everywhere. She says they have also 
thought about using security cameras. 
Bev Munsen 
Bev Munsen has been operating "What's Cooking," a restaurant at the Bloomington 
Strip Mall, for about ten years. The restaurant, according to Munsen, has a "large range," 
drawing people even from the outer suburbs. Many local people walk and bus there, partly 
because there are few restaurants in the immediate area. 
Munsen believes there are generally few problems at the restaurant, limited mainly 
to minor thefts and purses being taken, though there are a variety of crimes in the 
neighborhood. She is aware that houses have been broken into and cars have been stolen 
as well as the occurrence of a break-in at the bowling alley. 
She says some of her customers have expressed concerns about the crime level and 
are worried about coming there, especially after dark. Munsen says the one thing that has 
affected the look and feel of the area most is the moving of new businesses into formerly 
vacant areas, such as Coast to Coast hardware and the Laundromat at the Bloomington strip 
mall. 
Munsen is concerned about the recent number of turnovers in the neighborhood's 
housing and is worried that has led to a situation where people don't know each other. 
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Munsen believes this instability and lack of community is a major problem when it comes 
to crime. She sees block clubs as a positive solution to this problem and is glad they are 
catching on. 
Brian Peterson 
Brian Peterson has owned Peterson's Hardware at the comer of Bloomington and 
38th for 9 years, though the store has been in the family for 40 years. He has been 
working at the store since 6th grade and has been involved with the business for 30 years. 
He himself has lived in Bloomington for the past ten years. Peterson says he knows the 
neighborhood well and about 80 percent of his business is from the Bancroft 
neighborhood. 
Peterson believes crime has increased in the years he has owned the store. His 
sense is that the "border" of crime was Lake Street, and that the "crime scene" has been 
moving farther south. Bancroft itself has no real pockets of crime, except for maybe a few 
drug houses. A lot of the problem has to do with non-owner occupied buildings. His 
sense is that Powderhom Park has more non-owner occupied structures. Peterson believes 
absentee landlords who don't maintain their property or properly screen their tenants are 
partly responsible for high crime in that area But for the most part, the apartment 
' 
complexes in Bancroft, such as Bush Terrace, are nicely kept up. Peterson is concerned 
with the random nature of crime, though he himself hasn't had a break-in for a while and 
he says about 90 percent of the people who come into the store "are good, hardworking" 
people. Peterson says that older customers who have lived in the area for a while are afraid 
that crime is too close and are moving away. Younger people seem to be more likely to 
have the attitude that the area is "crime free." 
Peterson sees the media's labeling of "South Minneapolis" as a high crime area as 
something that hurts the area. Although it is true you have to keep doors locked and must 
be careful at night, Peterson doesn't see that as different from anywhere else. There are 
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occasional problems with graffiti. He thinks there are good neighborhood groups in 
Bancroft. 
Jane Ellis 
Jane Ellis has been working at Bancroft school for six years. Although she lives in 
downtown Minneapolis, she is very familiar with the neighborhood. It is part of her job 
description to be involved in the area and to be aware of issues facing the neighborhood. 
She reads the Southside newspaper cover to cover. She cites 38th and Chicago as a 
problem area, and is concerned with Chicago all the way up to Lake Street. She is not 
comfortable having kids play at Phelps and Powderhorn P¥k. 
'!· 
She believes that within the past two and a half years, crime incidents have 
escalated at the school. There have been more frequent reports of strangers in the building 
and precautions have been taken. The front doors are typically locked and there is only one 
entrance that visitors have access to during the school day. There have also been incidents 
of petty thievery, especially of teacher's purses, which tends to escalate at the end of the 
month as bills are due and budgets are thin. The school has also been using security 
cameras. Parents and families want the school to be welcoming and there is concern with 
alienating them, but that must be balanced with security concerns. 
Ellis is concerned with transient housing in the area. Turnover rates are 
"incredible" and she refers to these as "slumlord properties:" There is also a lack of upkeep 
on this housing. Another problem is crack houses, which she is aware of through 
students. She believes there are some houses on Elliot Avenue that are problem properties. 
However, the police make this difficult to confirm. The amount of bureaucracy she has to 
go though to have them investigated so she can change a bus stop is frustrating. Many of 
the problems, Ellis believes, could be solved by better screening applicants for apartments 
and duplexes. She feels that they are "inviting" these people in by having lower standards. 
She believes this especially a problem for Section Eight housing. She refers to the pattern 
j 
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of landlords to failing to screen their tenants and then evicting them because of their 
behavior only to have that tenant rent from another landlord who also fails to check their 
background as the "dance of the lemon." 
Ellis says only about 20 percent of kids at the school are from Bancroft. This 
makes community building difficult. After school activities can't be provided because of 
the high cost of busing children after the events are over. The school itself is no longer 
integrated with the surrounding area, but instead is an island. Neighbors of the school 
have to deal with the traffic and the noise, without receiving any benefits. She would like 
to see more efforts to bring the community and the school together, more events and 
cooperative ventures. One project that is designed to do this is the new school playground 
which is currently under construction. Much work was done with the community to make 
sure the school's playground could be a resource for children in the surrounding housing 
as well as the school children. This effort has included getting tot-safe equipment, and 
making the area more accessible. 
Occurrence of Crime in Bancroft 
As part of this study, data were obtained from the Minneapolis Police Department's 
Crime Analysis Unit. The time period included the months of June, July and August for 
the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. This approach was used to avoid the costs incurred in 
obtaining the data, as the Crime Analysis Unit charges $5.00 per quarter year. A period of 
three years was chosen to try and achieve a sense of what sort of patterns can be seen over 
a long time interval and to prevent the assumption that a year with an abnormal number of 
incidents represented the norm. The summer months were chosen because that is when the 
most crimes are reported, which would ensure that a large enough sample was collected. 
The study area examined included the Bancroft neighborhood and selected adjacent 
areas. Although a larger study area may have been more informative and provided a better 
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regional picture of crimes in the Bancroft area, it was felt that the emphasis should remain 
on Bancroft. This way residents examining the data would be prevented from focusing on 
areas of high crime outside Bancroft, where the Neighborhood Association will not be 
directing its resources. Also, using a smaller area kept the amount of data manageable and 
kept it from becoming the main focus of the project The study area has a north-south bias 
in part because of the limitations of the Crime Analysis Unit's computer software. 
Because these crimes have been separated out by type, it is easier to make 
observations about patterns specific to different types of crime. The crimes chosen for this 
study included robbery, burglary, damage to property and vehicle related crimes. These 
were chosen for two reasons. First they are crimes that could reasonably be influenced by 
environmental design. Crimes such as domestic abuse or white collar crime were ignored 
because they are not thought to be influenced by aspects of environmental design. Second, 
these crimes were chosen because they are more frequent in the Bancroft area. Cases of 
assault were ignored because it was believed there would be an insufficient number of 
cases to see a pattern. 
The objective of looking at this data is to identify patterns of reported crimes in the 
neighborhood and determine whether or not a CPTED program would be an effective way 
of dealing with crime in Bancroft. 
Limitations of the Data 
There are certain problems with the quality of the data and with displaying them. 
The maps included in this portion of the report are maps of reported crimes, and it cannot 
be assumed that they are wholly accurate depictions of crime in the area. Unfortunately, 
what may have been the most instructive element of this study is the lack of knowledge we 
have about the occurrence of crime, which makes it difficult to judge the effectiveness of 
any implementation of CPTED. Many incidents go unreported, especially if the victim 
fears reprisal, or does not want to call the police because they themselves are involved in 
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illegal activity. Furthermore, the data as presented does not differentiate the severity of the 
crime. Reports of damage to property fail to indicate the severity or the degree of damage. 
In looking at the computer generated maps there are certain limitations to the 
presentation of the data. First, if a crime occurs more than once at a location, there is no 
way to detect that fact from the maps. Therefore multiple incidents may have occurred at a 
location despite the fact there appears to be only one marker there. Accurate counts of the 
number of incidents of a particular crime during the study period are indicated in the legend 
to give the reader an indication of how closely the distribution on the map reflects the 
number of crimes that occurred. A second limitation results from an attribute that is 
inherent to the computer software used to display the information. All blocks are assumed 
to have one hundred addresses on them between one street and another (i.e., addresses on 
the section of a street between 38th street and 39th street will range from 3800 to 3898). 
The computer then places a point on a block according to where it would sit on the number 
line. Therefore, an address of 3844 would be placed approximately in the middle of the 
block, even though in reality it would be at the end of the block. This problem can be seen 
in the following maps (Figures 12 - 21). If a line is drawn through the center of the 
blocks, it would appear that no crimes occurred on the south half of the blocks. This facet 
of the program is not a problem when mapping areas on a larger scale. However, it can 
lead to distortions when viewed at the neighborhood level. Crime plots are accurate as 
block totals, but not as exact locations. 
Even with these limitations in mind, these maps provide an extraordinarily detailed 
depiction of different crimes that occur in the Bancroft neighborhood and the surrounding 
area. 
Robbery 
Robberies are incidents where a person is confronted by the criminal and robbed of 
either money or a possession. Robbery is an infrequent occurrence in Bancroft. For the 
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total time period observed, only 67 robberies occurred over the entire study area, and less 
than a third of those occurred with the Bancroft neighborhood. Over a period of nine 
months, when criminal activity is at its peak, fewer than 30 incidents occurred within the 
boundaries of the Bancroft neighborhood. Most clusters that appear on an aggregated map 
for the three years are made up of only three incidents. 
Robberies tend to be located in the northwest portion of the study area. The largest 
cluster is at the corner of Chicago Avenue South and East 35th Street. The fact that more 
incidents are to the north corresponds with a city-wide pattern where incidents of crime are 
highest south of the central business district, and diminish in concentration as distance from 
that area increases. The clustering of incidents to the west reflects the influence of the 
Chicago Avenue Corridor, which is a heavily trafficked mixed use thoroughfare that 
suffers heavily from blight. Robberies are not only associated with Chicago A venue itself, 
but also with Columbus A venue South and Elliot A venue South, to the immediate east and 
west. It may be likely that offenders are following their victims off the main street and 
preying on them once they are off the main thoroughfare. 
There are few incidents in the center of the neighborhood. Despite the presence of 
the strip mall, there are only two reported instances in that area, and both of those took 
place in the same year. Furthermore, Cedar Avenue, which has the highest traffic volume 
of the major streets in the area, as well as mixed land use and high density structures has 
few instances of reported robberies. 
Robbery is unique among the crimes selected for this study in that the majority of 
robberies have a known time of occurrence. Crimes such as burglary and vandalism occur 
during long time intervals that prevent us from knowing what time of day they took place. 
In the case of robberies, the victims are able to give specific time intervals between when 
the crime began and when it ended, and robberies rarely last more than a few minutes. 
This fact allows us to make generalizations about the time of reported robberies. For the 
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purpose of this study, the time a robbery was reported to have begun was used to plot a 
map not only of where robberies occurred, but when. 
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Robberies occur far more frequently in the evening, which appears to correspond to 
people's fears about being out alone at night (Figure 7). But it can also be seen that the 
number of incidents rises sharply at about 2:00 PM (1400) and the peak actually occurs at 
6:00 PM (1800). This pattern suggests that lighting is not the only relevant factor in the 
occurrence of these crimes. The lack of informal social surveillance could be a contributing 
factor in crimes taking place late at night However, since the number of crimes peaks in 
the late afternoon and early evening, when an increase in activity would be likely as people 
leave work and run errands before returning home, this hypothesis would appear to be 
inaccurate. Overall, these are small numbers, with the peak hour having only nine 
incidents total for the entire study area. 
When mapped, these data show us that many of the robberies that occurred in the 
afternoon between 1 :00 and 4:00 PM occurred in the Bancroft area (Figure 11). If we keep 
in mind that there may be daylight as late as 9:30 PM in the summer months in the Twin 
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Cities, it is clear that the majority of incidents in Bancroft are occurring during daylight 
hours. The implication of this is that it is not lighting in these areas that is the problem, 
because clearly that would not be an issue during the middle of the day. 
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Figure 11: Robbery in Bancroft Plotted by Time 
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Burglary 
Burglaries are crimes in which the offender enters a dwelling unit with the intent to 
steal an item or items. A 1971 study showed that the majority of burglars tend to be 
young, with almost 83 percent of arrested burglars under 25 and over 51 percent were 
under 18 (Pyle et al., 22-23). There is also a strong correlation between areas with high 
burglary rates and areas with high offender rates. That is to say, burglaries are more likely 
to be committed by offenders who live in that area (Boggs, 903) 
As in the case of robbery, there are more incidents in the northwest portion of the 
study area, but the difference in the distribution is not as pronounced. Unlike robbery, 
there is not a distinct correlation between major thoroughfares and areas with a high 
number of incidents (Figures 12 - 14). There does appear to be a larger number of 
incidents in areas that are more "central." Fourteenth Avenue South, which runs through 
the center of the neighborhood has the fewest reported incidents during the period. The 
most heavily trafficked streets, including Chicago Avenue South, Cedar, Bloomington and 
East 38th Street have comparatively few incidents. For two out of the three years of the 
study, on the portion of Chicago avenue that borders Bancroft, no incidents of burglary 
took place. This fact is more significant when it is taken into consideration that the absolute 
number of dwelling units, or potential targets, is actually higher on these streets than in 
other portions of the study area due to the number of apartment buildings. 
Streets without large amounts of trat:fic, however, do have a higher number of 
incidents of burglary, such as Eleventh Avenue South, and Seventeenth Avenue South. 
These are primarily residential streets, and both have little access to public areas, such as 
commercial areas or parks. This phenomenon would appear to confirm Jacobs' "eyes on 
the street" hypothesis and corresponds with Bill Hillier's finding that more segregated 
dwellings are more likely to be burgled (Hillier, 79). However, 12th Avenue South, which 
is adjacent to 11th Avenue South, is also not a major thoroughfare and lacks access to a 
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public area, has a low number of incidents. Therefore we can not draw any firm 
conclusions about the effect of "eyes on the street." 
Streets with high volumes of traffic, commercial areas, or apartments are not 
associated with a disproportionate number of crimes. Instead, isolated residential streets 
that do have these features seem to have the largest number of reported burglaries of the 
study period. This pattern seems logical in that burglary is a crime that requires stealth, so 
criminals would probably be disinclined to engage in burglary where there are high 
volumes of people. Unfortunately, we lack enough data to make generalizations about 
when burglaries occur. The time interval between when a person leaves his/her residence 
and returns to discover it has been burglarized may be days, if not weeks. However, in a 
neighborhood where almost 70 percent of the labor force commutes to work by car, it is 
unlikely that there is much in the way of informal social surveillance occurring during the 
day, which would provide potential offenders with plenty of opportunity to move through 
the neighborhood without being detected. This point, however, brings up a more 
important question: How likely is it that a program focusing on informal social surveillance 
will be effective in addressing this sort of crime when the population available to provide 
that surveillance is extremely small? It would appear to be unlikely. 
i 
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Figure 12: Burglary, 1993 
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Figure 14: Burglary, 1995 
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Damage to Property 
Vandalism crimes classified as "damage to property" (excluding automobiles) tend 
to cluster near heavily trafficked streets (Figures 16-18). Higher numbers of vandalism 
related crimes occurred near or on Chicago, Cedar and Bloomington A venues. Clusters are 
especially prominent near commercial areas, such as the Bloomington A venue strip mall, 
the comer of 38th and Bloomington, and the intersection of Chicago and 38th. In 1994, 
the Bancroft neighborhood and surrounding area suffered a rash of vandalism (Figure 17). 
According to residents this was related to a gang "turf war" that was concentrated near the 
intersection of Chicago and 38th. The community instituted a campaign to remove the 
vandalism that resulted, and since then, the number of incidents has decreased. 
Crimes classified as "damage to automobiles," seen alongside damage to property, 
do not appear to coincide with heavily trafficked corridors. Although there are clusters 
along the major arterial streets, the pattern of incidents is generally dispersed throughout the 
study area. In fact, in 1993, there was a large concentration of damage to automobiles 
located in the center of the neighborhood. In both damage to property and damage to 
automobiles there are more incidents in the north portion of the study area and fewer in the 
south. However, in the case of damage to cars, there is not a heavier concentration to the 
west as is the case with other types of crime. 
The conclusions we can draw from these observations are that vandalism to 
property coincides with heavily trafficked areas, and efforts to reduce this crime should be 
focused on areas that have large numbers of people moving through them. Efforts to curb 
vandalism of property may be ineffective in curbing damage to automobiles, because the 
two types of events appear to be dependent on the different factors. It is possible that the 
high dispersion rate of damage to automobile is related to the fact that crimes are being 
reported from the home of the victim, which may not be where the damage was inflicted. It 
is worth noting, however, that there are few, and in fact for two of the three years, no 
64 
reports of damage to a motor vehicle on Bloomington A venue. This lack of incidents is 
relevant because it is one of the few places where a concentration of parking exists in the 
Bancroft neighborhood and it is an area with a large number of people coming and going. 
Despite the concentration of motor vehicles in this area, and the higher number of potential 
offenders, there is a distinct absence of incidents. In contrast, a large number of incidents 
were reported on Cedar Avenue, south of 41st Street, where there is relatively little parking 
available. 
Like many of the crimes being examined in this study, many incidents of vandalism 
are not reported as occurring at a precise time. The time interval during which the incident 
may have occurred may be many hours, or even days. However, for about two thirds of 
the incidents a specific time interval is known. In order to analyze the data, incidents of 
damage to property where the reported "beginning time" and "ending time" of the crime is 
one hour or less were separated out and plotted on a histogram by time (Figure 15). This 
group of incidents may not accurately reflect the actual distribution of all the damage to 
property crimes. Many reports were not used because the time interval during which the 
incident took place was too great For instance, the extremely low number of reported 
incidents during the day may be because those crimes that do occur during the day are not 
reported until someone returns in the evening. It is clear that many incidents are taking 
place at night, with a large portion of them occurring after midnight This trend would 
seem to support Jacob's "eyes on the street" hypothesis, as clearly a large number of 
incidents are occurring when there is little social surveillance. However, given the low 
level of human activity that occurs after midnight, it would no doubt be difficult to create a 
sense that there is social surveillance occurring at these times. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of Incidents of Damage to Property by Time 
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Figure 17: Damage Detail, 1994 
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Figure 18: Damage Detail, 1995 
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Vehicle Crimes 
Data on vehicle related crimes were collected as part of the study. The maps 
generated by the Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit show four categories of vehicle 
crimes--motor-vehicle theft, recovered stolen vehicle, theft from auto, and damage to auto. 
For many of these crimes there is de-concentration of incidents from north to south. Of the 
33 total incidents of recovered stolen motor vehicles, only one occurred south of 42nd 
street, while the majority of the incidents occurred north of 38th street. However, "theft 
from auto" is more evenly distributed throughout the study area. A greater concentration of 
crimes can be seen in the west part of the study area. 
Motor vehicle theft is highly dispersed and follows no clear pattern. Incidents 
occur both in heavily trafficked areas and in isolated areas. This lack of correlation also 
appears to be the case for theft from auto. With the exception of the data from 1995, when 
a large number of thefts from autos were reported on Cedar A venue south of 42nd Street, 
these incidents do not appear to cluster along heavily trafficked corridors. Bloomington 
A venue South, as noted before, has few incidents reported on it despite the high number of 
cars and of potential offenders. The random nature of these crimes may be a result of the 
fact that auto related crimes have a low correlation between occurrence rates and off ender 
rates (Boggs, 903). That would mean individuals responsible for these crimes are coming 
from other areas, they lack a sophisticated knowledge of the area they are committing their 
offenses in. In that sense, this is perhaps the most "opportunistic" of crimes. 
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Figure 19: Vehicle Crimes, 1993 
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Figure 20: Vehicle Crimes, 1994 
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Figure 21: Vehicle Crimes, 1995 
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Summary on the Occurrence of Crime in Bancroft 
The purpose of looking at these data on different crimes in Bancroft was to examine 
the distribution of the patterns to either confirm or deny assumptions of Crime Prevention 
through Environmental Design, and to provide a base for recommendations for 
implementing CPTED in Bancroft. 
The distribution of different crimes differs widely in number and geographical 
location. In almost all of the types of crimes looked at there was a strong bias to the north 
and west portion of the study area, reflecting larger, city-wide trends. In the case of 
robbery, it was found that the number of actual incidents is quite small, and it is difficult to 
discern a pattern. Many of the robberies occurred during daylight hours, and that would 
appear to suggest that street-lighting is not necessarily the dominant causal factor. 
Burglaries tend to occur on streets primarily made up of single family residential homes and 
in areas without access to public spaces. Although this pattern supports the idea that 
informal social surveillance can limit crime, because there are large portions of the 
population who are gone during the day, it is unlikely that this strategy will be effective. 
Crimes that involve damage to property show a strong correlation to heavily trafficked 
areas, especially at busy interactions and commercial areas. The distribution of times of the 
incidents, when such information is available, shows that a large number of incidents occur 
late in the evening and after midnight. This pattern would seem to support the idea that 
"eyes on the street," deter crime, it fails to supply a remedy to solve that problem. 
Summary on the Bancroft Neighborhood 
The Bancroft neighborhood is a middle-class, residential area located in South 
Minneapolis. From informal conversations with a variety of residents and the lack of 
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participation in neighborhood sponsored crime events, it appears as though crime is not a 
major concern in the Bancroft neighborhood. The areas they are most concerned about are 
on the peripheries of the neighborhood, most notably at the intersection of Chicago A venue 
South and East 38th Street. Business owners also do not see crime as a large problem, 
although their customers, who sometimes come from all over the Twin Cities, do have 
negative perceptions about the area. One of the most frequently cited problems is absentee 
landlords who do not maintain their property. 
Data collected from the Minneapolis Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit show 
that the pattern of crime varies from one type of incident to another. Although some 
conclusions can be drawn, given the limited amount of data available on crime, it is difficult 
to evaluate the concepts of CPTED and to make specific recommendations for its 
implementation. It is clear that informal social surveillance may have limited effectiveness 
in Bancroft and it would also be difficult to accurately evaluate a CPTED program's 
effectiveness in reducing the crime rate. 
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Ill. The Implementation of CPTED in the Bancroft 
Neighborhood 
Summary of Recommendations 
The final portion of this report includes recommendations for implementing CPTED 
in the Bancroft neighborhood. It is recommended that the Bancroft Neighborhood 
Association (BNA) implement target hardening measures because those have been shown 
the most effective at reducing crime. The two areas where physical changes should be 
made include commercial areas and alleyways behind houses. The BNA should continue 
with other community projects currently in progress as part of its Neighborhood Action 
Plan. While implementing these programs, special attention should be made to insure that 
people are involved, so they become more familiar with the neighborhood. Finally, it is 
recommended that the BNA do further research in other issues, such as absentee landlords, 
to determine how to address resident concerns. 
Target Hardening in Bancroft 
According to Karen Skrivseth of Community Crime Prevention SAFE (CCP 
SAFE), a large percentage of burglaries in the Bancroft neighborhood are actually garage 
break-ins, and many of these are unforced entries. In addition, one resident mentioned the 
lack of adequate security devices on the windows of elderly residents' homes. 
Therefore, the first recommendation of this report is that the neighborhood 
concentrate its crime prevention resources on a target-hardening campaign. This program 
should include making a security survey available to residents, or helping to make 
information available. The neighborhood may also wish to offer a subsidy to residents 
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who participate in the campaign for security devices. Target hardening has been shown to 
be the most effective means of reducing crime in an area, and in comprehensive CPTED 
programs, such as the one implemented in Portland, it has been the most successful part of 
the program. 
Changes to the Physical Environment in Bancroft 
The two major areas where resources should be focused to change the physical 
appearance of Bancroft are the alleyways and commercial areas. Both of these areas can be 
linked either to people's perception of crime or the actual occurrence of reported crimes. 
Many of the changes that may be made could be funded through other BNA projects with 
similar goals. Other solutions to changing the physical environment, such as changing the 
street layout or creating new community spaces, are not recommended because of the 
expense involved, the difficulty in implementing such changes and the lack of demonstrated 
effectiveness over a long period of time. 
Improvement of Commercial Areas 
The most effective areas for the Bancroft Neighborhood Association to consider 
implementing the physical change aspect of CPTED would be the commercial areas in and 
around the neighborhood. CPTED techniques should be implemented at the intersection of 
38th and Chicago and at the Bloomington Avenue strip mall. A survey of residents has 
indicated that these are the areas that residents feel are most unsafe. Because there is little 
evidence to suggest that CPTED has an impact on crime rates, it should not be expected that 
the crime rate itself ~ll drop significantly in these areas. Instead, these changes should be 
designed to improve people's perceptions of the area, and thus improve the quality of life in 
the neighborhood. An important factor that has contributed to the "unsafe" feeling of many 
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of these commercial areas is the fact they have deteriorated and do not appear well 
maintained. 
The BNA should explore the possibility of changing the exterior of buildings so 
that there is better surveillance of the street immediately outside the business. This need is 
especially apparent at the intersections of 38th and Bloomington, 38th and Chicago, and 
42nd and Cedar (Figure 22). Currently these are areas faced with blank walls where there 
is evidence that they have been subject to vandalism such as graffiti. There is no sense that 
surveillance is occurring from the buildings. Not only do people feel unsafe but the lack of 
surveillance may actually attract illegal activity. 
If it is possible, the BNA should consider helping business owners add to the 
number of windows on the buildings. If not, then the character of these walls should be 
changed so they do not attract vandalism. By painting these walls with murals or covering 
them with ivy, graffiti can be discouraged. 
Figure 22: East 38th Street and Bloomington A venue 
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The BNA should work to bring businesses into the area that will attract residents to 
the commercial areas. One resident told me that there were few businesses at the 
intersection of 38th and Chicago that she patronized. In my interview with Brian Peterson, 
he indicated he was not as familiar with the businesses in that area as he was with other 
parts of the neighborhood. It may be that because few people go there, most people have a 
poor impression of it, as they are limited to what is seen when driving through. Efforts 
should be made to attract businesses to the area that residents from the neighborhood would 
be attracted to and use. This effort would increase residents' familiarity with the area and 
prevent it from simply being stereotyped as a "high crime area." It will also help to 
redefine the area in a way that reflects the values of the neighborhood, and will appear 
attractive to people moving through the area. Drawing in neighborhood residents would 
also provide social surveillance of the area by people who are not transient, such as the 
people who are waiting for the bus, but rather by people who have "ownership" of the 
area. 
Improvement of Alleyways 
One type of crime that may be addressed by CPTED are vehicle crimes such as 
damage to auto and theft from auto. Unlike burglary and robbery, in which the offender 
seeks out a specific target, automobile crimes are more likely to be spur of the moment 
incidents because of the offender's lack of familiarity with the area. These crimes are also 
more likely to be committed by someone from outside the immediate area. Therefore the 
appearance of social surveillance may be an effective deterrent to these incidents. A focus 
for such a prevention effort would the alley - ways where neighborhood residents park 
their cars. 
The Bancroft neighborhood, like many of the residential neighborhoods in 
Minneapolis, has a network of alleyways that run behind the housing. These alleyways 
provide a convenient form of off-street parking as well as an area to place waste receptacles 
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for pickup. In the case of the Bancroft neighborhood, these alleys run from north to south 
with one entrance/exit on either end of the block. The alleys parallel the streets, but are 
semi-private spaces. These alleys would be another area where physical changes might be 
implemented in the Bancroft neighborhood. These areas could be better defined by making 
physical changes that highlight the area's semi-private status and show a sense of 
ownership to the area. Furthermore attempts could be made to increase social surveillance 
by removing obstacles and increasing the visibility of the alley from the houses 
surrounding it. 
Alleys are often the most neglected area of the residential neighborhood. They are 
cramped spaces and the presence of the detached garages offers a multitude of hiding places 
for a potential offender. Because they are off the street, there may be a tendency for 
residents not to take care of their portion of the alley because the majority of people will 
never see the area. Furthermore, many people put up fences between the alley's pavement 
and their backyards, in some cases creating a "no man's" land where nobody appears to 
own the alley itself. In some c,ases, fences are built so that there is little opportunity for 
surveillance from the yard or house on the other side. Alleys can become a dumping 
ground for unwanted items, such as old tires or used furniture. Alleys may also become a 
play area for children if there is no other suitable area nearby (St. Paul PED). 
80 
Figure 23: View of a Bancroft Alley Looking North 
Figure 24: Area Lacking Surveillance in an Alley 
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Figure 25: View of Bancroft Alley Showing "Disowned Territory" 
These factors contribute to the sense that no one owns the alley. Instead of being 
"semi-private," it takes on the appearance of a "semi-public" space. This may lead people 
to feel they can go through alleys without danger of trespassing. It may also make 
residents less concerned with people moving through the alley, and less likely to question 
whether someone is there legitimately or not. This allows potential offenders, especially 
offenders who may commit crimes on the spur of the moment, access to people's private 
space and belongings. 
It is therefore recommended that improvements be made to change the character of 
these alleyways so they no longer appear to be "semi-public," but are once again, clearly 
"semi-private." There should be an increase in the sense of ownership of the area by 
residents and a decrease in the accessibility to non-residents. 
One simple way to do this would be to make sure that the alleys are well 
maintained. The amount of litter and discarded material should be kept to a minimum. It 
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would also be worth investigating different trash collection methods that would discourage 
residents from using the alley as a dumping ground for their trash and unwanted 
belongings. Another option to be considered would be some sort of barrier, real or 
symbolic, at the entrances and exits of alleys. This could be done with a simple marker 
device. 
Creating informal social surveillance and reducing opportunities for concealment is 
more difficult. Many of the structures in the alley, such as fences and garages, may reduce 
the potential for informal social surveillance, but removing them would be costly and 
would encounter opposition. Fences that obstruct a house's view on the alley may have 
been put up deliberately and the owner might be reluctant tq have it removed. The garages, 
while they reduce the visibility of these areas, are functional. It is doubtful that any 
residents would want to give up their garage with the prospect of their car not starting in the 
harsh Minnesota winter. Garages also serve to protect cars from vandalism. Therefore, 
the Bancroft Neighborhood Association may want to consider encouraging homeowners 
not to put up obstructing fences, but it is unlikely that any other initiative in this direction 
would be successful. 
Finally, it is recommended that the BNA or block-group develop projects that utilize 
the space inside of alleyways (perhaps for community or small garden plots), have regular 
alley clean-up days when the weather permits, encourage residents to watch over their 
alleyways, and perhaps designate someone from the block to do a quick walk through the 
alleyway during the day. One potential project the BNA could sponsor would be a survey 
of the alleyways to determine which alleys are in need of the most improvement. The BNA 
could also encourage alley clean-ups by awarding some sort of prize on periodic basis to 
the blocks with the best maintained alleyways, based on their cleanliness and their "sense 
of place." 
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Other Physical Improvements 
A concern that many residents and some of the business owners cited was the lack 
of care absentee landlords put into their rental properties. It is recommended that the 
neighborhood initiate a survey of absentee landlord properties to determine which 
properties are being poorly maintained, have frequent incidents of crime, and lack adequate 
security such as locks or a controlled entrance. This survey can be accomplished through a 
visual inspection of the property based on a list of set criteria, information from the 
Minneapolis Police Department and interviews with residents. 
Community Building in Bancroft 
Although the community building rationale may be an important to contributing to 
the quality of life in the neighborhood, it is recommended that the Bancroft neighborhood 
avoid using funds designated for crime prevention to address the community building 
aspect of CPTED beyond the organization of block clubs;, Because the goals of community 
building are consistent with the goals of other BNA activities, any effort to incorporate this 
aspect of CPTED might lead to unnecessary duplication and devour scarce resources that 
might be more effective elsewhere. 
Instead, the BNA should encourage the various committees in its organization to 
keep CPTED principles in mind when they implement different projects. For example, if 
the garden committee plans to create a neighborhood garden plot, they may want to 
consider locating it in an area that is perceived as unsafe. That is, do as Jane Jacobs 
:·; 
suggests and place a "safe activity" in an "unsafe location." That sort of project would give 
an area a more desirable "sense of place" as well as provide informal social surveillance 
when people work at the garden plot. Other committees might sponsor neighborhood 
events such as block parties that would increase interaction between residents, or a program 
that would encourage residents to walk their dogs at a certain time. These activities do not 
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necessarily have to have a crime focus. It is more important that residents become more 
familiar with each other and take pride in their community. Support for these activities 
could possibly be found in the local business community. 
The BNA should also consider working closely with Bancroft school to implement 
community building projects. Jane Ellis, the assistant principal at Bancroft school has 
expressed an interest in creating more interaction with the neighborhood and with 
Minneapolis's return to "neighborhood" schools, the BNA has the opportunity to make the 
school a focus for neighborhood-oriented activity. Jane Ellis mentioned that she would like 
to hold a dedication ceremony for the school's new playground in the spring when the 
improvements are finished. The neighborhood should also consider implementing a "walk 
with your child to school" event so parents can interact more with the school and become 
.] 
aware of what sorts of difficulties their children encounter on the way to school everyday. 
It is recommended that the BNA continue its efforts to get its business involved in 
either a neighborhood or regional business association. Such a step would encourage 
businesses to take more interest in the community, in turn fostering connections between 
the residents and the businesses. It will also encourage businesses to watch over each 
other's property. In my interview with Brian Peterson, he said that the gas station across 
the street of ten looks after his business after it has closed. This sort of activity needs to be 
supported and further developed. 
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Conclusion 
The pmpose of this report was to critically review the concept of Crime Prevention 
through Environmental Design and then provide recommendations for specific proposals 
for the Bancroft Neighborhood. 
It has been found that CPTED is a different approach to solving crime problems, in 
that is focuses on prevention instead of apprehension and incarceration, but focuses 
attention on one particular aspect that may cause crime, and that is opportunity. CPTED 
relies heavily on people's sense of "territoriality" and the use of informal social surveillance 
as a method of reducing crime. 
Certain components of CPTED have been shown to be ineffective at reducing 
crime. Changing the layout of the streets has been shown to be difficult to implement 
because of local opposition, and the effects on crime are negligible. Furthermore, it has 
been shown that more segregated dwellings are more subject to burglary. The creation of 
"neighborhood safe spots" may be ineffective if people still perceive it as a high crime area 
and do not use the space. Increasing the amount of street lighting may not affect the 
number of robberies occurring in Bancroft, as many happen during daylight hours. 
CPTED's reliance on informal social surveillance may cause it to be an ineffective 
prevention strategy for some crimes in the Bancroft neighborhood. Many incidents of 
vandalism, for instance, occur late at night, when no social surveillance would expected. 
I 
The fact that the majority of Bancroft's work-force commutes to work by car or bus limits 
the opportunity for social surveillance in Bancroft's residential areas during the day. This 
phenomenon is reflected by the spatial distribution of burglaries in the neighborhood. 
A comprehensive CPTED program, while it cannot be expected to reduce crime 
dramatically, may affect people's perceptions of an area and affect the overall quality of life 
for residents in the neighborhood. The strongest emphasis should be placed on target 
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hardening, which has been shown to be the most effective and enduring component of 
CPTED. The emphasis should then be placed on improving the economic vitality and the 
"look and feel" of neighborhood commercial areas. If the neighborhood is interested in 
pursuing the creation of informal social surveillance, an effective implementation could be 
made in the alleyways in Bancroft The community building aspect of CPTED is similar to 
the goals of the Bancroft Neighborhood Association. Already existing non-crime related 
activities and future events could be used for this purpose. 
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